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The following essay represents a search for heuristically 
useful theory to understand th~ forces of religious innovation 
in an African context. The search progresses by employing 
a model derived from studies in symbolic anthropology. That 
model is extended by integrating it with an intellectual 
model of paradigm change that has been suggested to account 
for religious conversion in Africa. The search is then 
furthered with greater contextual analysis of socio-economic 
.changes in Africa that occurred in the process of articulation 
of modes of production, seeking to understand how these 
changes relate to alterations in ideologies and religious 
beliefs and practices. The conclusion will then explore the 
role of the former s;-fmbolic model as it relates to the latter 
historical-materialist understanding in an attempt to account 
for the variability of expression that occurs in African religious 
innovation. 
Clifford Geertz, in an essay entitled, "Religion as a 
~ultural System", speaks of religion as (1966:4}; 
a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations 
in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an 
aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem 
uniquely realistic. 
Considerable emphasis is being placed, in a definition 
such as this, on the generative power of symbols in functioning 
to "synthesize a peoples• ethos". With notions of order 
prevailing as the ground of meaning, what is "intellectually 
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reasonable" and "emotionally convincing" is demanded from 
religion. It is in the symbolic element of religious expression 
~ 
that the capacity to achieve intellectual and emotional unity 
is located. At the same time to remain reasonable and convincing f) 
a certain correspondence between peoples• common sense view 
of the world as well as their scientific and aesthetic views 
must be maintained. However, this need not be a simple 
correspondence as religious claims generating credibility by 
the experience or symbolic ritual enactment offer what is 
held to be a wider view of reality within which other views 
~ 
are situated. Thus the religious view reserves judgement ~o 
correct and complete other views appealing to a wider conception 
of cosmic order. Religion is both shaped by common sense, 
scientific and aesthetic views, bu.t in turn can shape a persons 
understanding of the capacity of such views . (Geertz 1966:38-39). 
The threat of chaos with the anxiety it provokes is 
noted, in Geertz•s view, to be the driving force behind 
human conceptualizing on all levels including that of religious 
symbolic formation. Interpretation as it involves paradigm 
formation is an effort to counter this threat. However, 
Geertz delineates "three points where chaos--a tumult of events 
which lack not just interpretation but interpretability--
threatens to break in upon rnanz at the limits of his analytic 
ca pacity, at the limits of his powers of endurance, and at 
the limits of his moral insight" (1966:14). The first gives 
rise to the experience of "bafflement" as anomalies lead to 
the disintegration of inte ~ llectual paradigms. The second 
J 
point .concerns the "problem of suffering" where intense suffer-
ing becomes intolerably meaningless. The last point 
addresses the experience of "e.thical paradox" where a sense of 
~ 
moral coherence is lost when injustice prevails in human 
experience. 
· Using these three points as an outline,a study of religious 
innovation .can proceed. The disintegration that occurs at 
these limits when they are reached will provoke reintegrating 
efforts that may assume alternative symbolic structures and/or 
threat eliminating actions. A number of Jther recent studies 
offer insight into these dynamics in the African context. 
To be noted, however, is the extent to which this contextualiz-
ing extends or calls into question Geertz•s model. 
is the relation of history to symbolic structures • . 
I 
At issue J~ 
In a series of insightful articles,Robin Horton has 
advanced a theory for understanding religious change in 
Africa. By comparing and contrasting ~·African Traditional 
Thought and Western Science" in an art icle by that title (1971a), 
an d by delineating the nature of changes t hat have occurred in 
African traditional .thought with the advent of western indus;.:. 
r 
t1 alism and world religions, e.g. Is lam and Christianity, 
Horton develops his theory. Afri can traditiona l thought is 
s ho-..m to serve a very similar fun ct ion i n tradit iona l s ocieties 
as science does in industria lized s ocie ties . That is, a 
"concern wi t h explanation, predic t i on , an d c on t rol of space-
t ime events " is common to bot h (1971bi95). Though Hor ton has 
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borrowed this insight · from J .• D. Y. Peel's book, Aladura 1 
! Religious Movement among the. Yoruba (1968), he furthers it 
with specific comparisons. For example, both represent a 
"quest for unity underlying apparent diversity ••• for order 
underlying apparent disorder" while "seeking a causal contest 
wider than that provided by common sense" but at the same time 
granting that "common sense and theory have complementary 
roles in eve~yday life" , (1971aa1J2,1J5,140). The major 
difference between the two thought systems with regard to these 
observations is that traditionalists utilize a personal 
theoretical idiom predisposing people to see a connection 
between social disturbance and individual affliction and 
i~entifying in spirits and divinities a causal connectedness 
Western science, on the otherhand, uses an impersonal idiom 
with mechanistic causati.ve theories. (1971a1137). 
~ Further par allels between the two systems of thought 
v 
are noted in the common use of analogical methods in moving 
from the understood to 'yet to be clarified phenomenon and in 
the nature of model formation. The significant difference 
(and here Horton is unfairly comparing ideals with realities as 
he himself admits) is that traditional thought has "no developed 
awareness of alternatives to the e tablished body of theoretical 
tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an 
awareness is highly developed" ( 1971a 1153). An important 
consequence to the "closed" nature of traditional thought is 
that "any challenge to established tenets is a threat of chaos 
of the cosmic abyss, and therefore evokes intense anxiety" (1971 a:154) . 
Openness and developed awareness of alternatives diminishes the 
threat of absolute calamity ''that a serious challenge to those 
tenets poses" (1971a:154). BU;.t in traditional thought this 
threat can increase the rigidit~ of the system of thought 
with protective measures developed to preserve it (1971ai162f). 
With affinities to Geertz's model now evident in Horton's 
theory . it is possible to trace how the experience of bafflement 
would have emerged in the contact between traditional Africa 
and the outside world. Horton describes it as an encounter 
between a microcosm and a macrocosm. The microcosm is the 
traditional villagers•worldview consisting of common sense 
experience as well as religious view,,s including ancestral 
spirits, local deities and a vague notion of the Supreme 
Being along with the accompati'ing religious prescriptions and 
practices. These together form a relatively "closed" system 
of explanation-prediction-control while the personal idiom in 
which they are cast provides a spiritual grounding for communalism. 
Influence of a larger world-view penetrated not only the coast 
but much cf the interior ot Africa with the emergence of trading 
routes, and was followed.by the imperialistic impact leading 
to colonialism as well as missionizing efforts. Horton speaks 
of a "shattered microcosm" resulting f!'om the contact with the 
macrocosm that entailed a heightened consciousness of a larger 
worldview accompanied by new idioms of thought. In this 
anxiety provoking exposure~the African sought continuity 
between traditional cosmologies and the new worlclview. Some 
yague macrocosmic conceptions were seen to be present in the 
-s 
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traditional cosmologies such as the obscure notion of a 
Supreme Being. Horton's contention is that Africans were 
able to adjust to the new cons~iousness by adapting their 
own cosmologies, giving greater prominence to such notions. 
I 
The resulting inference is tha~"acceptance of Islam and 
Christianity (as macrocosmic belief systems with well developed 
conceptions of a Supreme Being) by the African •convert' is due 
as much to development of the traditional cosmology in response 
to other features of the modern situation as it is to the activi-
ties of the missionaries" (1971b:10J). Herein lie the roots 
of independent church movements in Africa as well. Missionary 
Christianity being rather intolerant of~ this continuity of 
traditional thought in the churches make it imperative that 
Africans initiate independent movements in order to be able 
to give full expression to the interpretive quest they experience. 
The erosion of the explanation-prediction-control function 
in modern ehristiani ty resulting fz·om the prominer.ce given in 
western thought to s cientific responses filling that function 
.has further aliez:1ated many Africans from mission Christianity. 
Modern Christianity is, in Horton's terms, a religion of communion 
emphas izing the r elational e lement. Explanation-predicti on - -
control functions such as prophets and faith-healers engage 
in are not tolerated in m~ern Christian churches as they are 
in many African independent church movements (1971b:105). 
But Africans in industrialized centers of Africa increasingly 
exposed to Western materialism with its impersonal theoretical 
idiom will, in Horton's opinion9 have to yield developing tradi-
tional cosm olo -~deal adaptations and accept the "depersonali-
... 
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zation of the idiom of all theory. In Africa, as in the West, 
it seems likely that religion, if it survives, will do so as 
a way Of COITL.~union, but not as a system Of explanation, prediction, 
and co~trol" (19711107). 
Reference can now be made back to Geertz•s model. In 
developing an intellectual theory of religious change, Horton 
has dealt mostly with changes that occur when people reach the 
limits cf their a..l"l.alytical capacities. A people:· 
confronted with a broader world-view ad~pt some of their 
ideas to fit into the intellectual religious scheme that is 
offered by the pene~trating influence. Thus, the change occurs 
while preserving some continuity, absorbing the stress caused 
by the baff'ientent by maintaiA~ some of the former ideas while 
accepting a new L~tellectual understanding. 
Horton's contribution is helpful on one level but, as w.Lll 
be noted, the anxiety provoking elements that led to change in 
Africa were not just intellectual ideas. But before addressing 
those is~ues,~ summary of some of the criticism that Horton's 
·position has dra...,n will be helpful. W. van Binsbergen,_who 
has had affini~ies in his own research with Horton's theory 
has nevertheless "been able to perceive weaknesses in that view . · 
and make efforts to move beyond it. To van Binsbergen,the 
micro~osm/macrocosm juxtaposition is a little too simple to be 
altogether correct. As he puts it, "Although there is consider-
able co~mcn-sense plausibility in the idea that lesser spirits 
administer the microcosm and greater spir its the macrocosm, 
one would require a full fledged theory of religious symbolism 
in order to arrive at a real systematic understanding of this 
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relationship" (1981:41). Further, Horton's theory represents 
another version of the classic correspondence theory of the 
social-scientific study of rel~gion. Van Binsbergen suggests 
the need for a "dialectical 'Tiew, in which, for instance, 
newly emerging religious ideas might constitute the negation 
rather than the re1.exion of a penetrating macrocosm (which is ) 
I 
nowhere considered in the Hortonian scheme" (1981:40). 
A critical insight that needs to be added here is what. \ 
Horton seems to miss by his reduction of religion to communion. 
With his clear bias for the intellectual capacity of explanation-
prediction-control rendered by western science he seems to fail 
to note the capacity inherent in religious communion as a force 
that creates a context of control. Out of this community 
solidarity.explanation as well as prediction can emerge. 
Horton has noted, as was mentioned already, the African's 
predisposi t ion to see a con.~ection between social disturbances 
and individual affli ction emerging from the personal iJom of 
r. 
African thought. But Horton fails to note how a maint~nence of 
a continuity with this idiom can in some respects yield an 
understanding that the western scient ific idiom misseso When 
van Binsbergen complains that the "Intellectual Theory has 
little to say on the organizational dimension of religious 
innovation~' he is addr essing this we a kne s s in Horton• s a pproach . 
In van Bins bergen•s words , "for a r el i gi ous i nnovation to estab-
lish itself, it ne e ds not only to s atisfy the intellectual 
requirements such as posed by individual mi nds r eflecting on the 
changing world order with which t hey a re confr onted. In a ddi t ion 
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the new ideas and rituals have to surround themselves by new 
and viable forms of religiou's organization" ( 1981: 38). The 
issue at stake here needs to be stated more clearly. The 
shattered microcosm, inasmuch as Horton's categories are useful, 
is not merely the br eaKdown of an intellectual paradigm, but 
a social transformation as well. This much Horton would 
certainly concur with. But the reformulation of a belief 
system has to be se~n concomitantly with the reorganization of 
the social organization of the religious comnn.ini ty. . 'J'hat 
organization wi th'.-.the control it provides may contribute .. as 
much to the revised belief system as that belief system does 
to the organization. In Horton's view the reformulation of 
· African beliefs predisposed them to accept Islamic and Christian 
missionary-led organizations. However, this was followed by 
cases of reorganization . by Africans in independent movements 
expressing more ~ecuraj;e:liV the struggles and quests rtfiey 
experience. When Horton speaks of the explanation-predicti~n­
control function of western thought, it needs to be noted that 
the explanation ~n terms of the impersonal idiom of western 
theorizing is what leads to prediction and control. African 
independent religious movements might better be understood 
if theemphasis was placed on control through the cohesion of 
religious organization with a very personal i diom prevailing. 
The control of the social organization can then both yield and 
be re-enforced by explanations and predi ctions. The resiliance 
of the personal idiom of belief has wider implications than 
Horton recognizes. In surrender ing that personal idiom , the 
10 
African is forced to concede to the justification given for his 
domination. 
Peter Rigby's study, entit-1.ed "Pastors and Pastoralistr 
The Differential Penetration of Christianity among East African 
Cattle Herders" (1981), advances an explanation as to why the 
Maasai did not respond to the teaching of the missionaries. 
, 
Though Rigby is addressing another context than · that of Horton's 
research .. his findings call into question some of Horton's 
conclusions. For the Maasai, the encounter with the "macrocosm" 
(a · term Rigby does not employ) did not predispose "conversion". 
Rigby's analysis offers a twofold reason for this. First, 
the Maasai held a cosmological view that was perceived by these 
people as "being one with pastoralist economic and political 
praxis ••• a relatively •nonalienated' form of ideological 
praxis ••• (which can ) be related dialectically to the relative 
absence of exploitative relations in these social formations" 
(1981:106). With clear insight into the value of what they 
enjoyed,the Maasai were able to recognize the threat posed by 
mission Christianity that in too many respects allied with 
colonial administration and even, in the case of the Maasai, 
endorsed efforts by colonialists to disrupt Maasai life believing 
that such changes would facilitate conversion. What we have in 
t his situation is in Horton ' s scheme, a microcosm that does 
not shatt er, having a certain res ilience that perpetuates 
the dialectically related cosmologi cal view and the socio~ · 
economic and poli t ical practices. I t appears t hat Horton's model 
only works in contexts where it is possible to disrupt social 
conditions as well or where ~evelopment of certain '!non-
alienating" cosmologies has been precluded historically.1 
~ 
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These issues move us to a different level in our examination of 
r~ligious changa. 
II 
Geertz•s understanding of intellectual bafflement as a 
breakdown point of symbolic structures may serve as the sole 
factor in religious change is some contexts but the shortcomings 
in Horten's view call into question whether it is the foremost 
mechanism of change in African religious innovation. It is 
interesting that van Binsberg.en, in developing a theory, begins 
to leave behind his affinities to Horton's model when he 
investigates "Religious Change and the Problem of Evil in 
Western Zambia" (1981: chapter 4). 
Geertz•s distincti on between the limits of human endurance 
and the limits of human moral insight, is an assumption that 
separates na~~ral evil from moral evil in a manner that is not 
always present in religion and especially not in African 
traditional religion. It is therefore necessary to combine 
much of the a.~alysis of these two points. The personal idiom 
utilized in traditional thought holds together ecological concerns 
with communal ones. Natural misfortunes are given personal 
explanations which it is the task of the diviner to reveal, 
be they divinities, irate ancestral spirits, or sorcery. 
Evans-Pritchar~ in studying the Azande,noted that these people 
seek an answer to a question western mate r ialism so often 
c 12 
uncannily leaves unanswered: "Why?"Not content to merely 
understa.~d how misfortune happens or how to deal with it, 
asking,~Why?", demands a personalized answer (taken from 
~ 
M.G. Marwick 1973:62). What van Binsbergen notes in studies 
done o~ Zai~bian affliction cults is that a fundamental c~ange 
occurs in the understanding of evil among these people with 
the rise of these cults. Misfortune is still attributed to 
spiritu:.l causes but the formerly identifiable local $!,ilprit 
spirits are now foreign and increasingly impersonal. This. 
together wit.11 ~"'l accentuated individualism to the point of 
. being "cul ts of egotism" making "no attempt to redress social 
conditions", is the innovative feature of affliction cults in 
van Binsberge.n' s analysis ( 1981i160). By tracing historically 
the advent of these cul ts and noting other par;:;·allel socio-
economic ~~d political developments that accompanied this religious 
innovation, van Binsbergen has contributed to a theory o~ African 
religious ir':.nova.tion utilizing the concept of the articulation 
of modes of production. Understanding gained from this histori-
cal development is then found to be applicable to other innovative 
religious moveme~ts. 
Without entering deeply into discussion of the concep~ 
of the articulation of mo des of production,. van Binsbergen 
utilizes a minimal definitionc 
A mode of production is a model that stipulates a specific 
arrangement according to which the productive forces 
(means of production, resources, labour and knowledge) 
existing at a particular time and place, are subject.:. __ 
to specific relations of production such as define forms 
of exnrooriation and control between the various classes 
of people involved in the production process ••. While the 
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basic social problem of meeting the material requirements 
of human life has to be solved by any society, different 
modes of production represent different solutions, 
within the range of variation that a particular level of 
development of the productive forces allows for... · 
Meanwhile, in most societ~es more than one mode of pro-
duction coexisiswith other modes. Modes of production 
can be said to be articulated ('linked') to one another 
if surplus~s ·- generated in one mode are expropriated so 
as to serve the reproduction of another dominant mode (198!.i43). 
Historical development in Zambia, with parallels . in much 
of Afri~, is then shown to have involved the emergence of · 
three new modes of production in the last few centuries. A 
domestic mode of production, basically agricultural with 
elders dominating younger generations and men holding a domin-
na..~ce over women1 was first articulated with a tributary mode 
cf production. The tributary mode of production involved the 
formation of tribute extracting chieftainships that expropriated 
surplus value from the domestic mode of production. With this 
I 
I 
I 
I 
development ca;:ne a further articulation with a mercantile capital 
moda of production as trading routes were established connecting 
local communities with distant tr~ding centers. Finally, the 
colonial onslau~~t introduced the industrial capital mode of 
~reduction articulating with a deeply effected but still 
surviving domestic mode of production~ (van Binsgergen 1981: 
43-44). '---
Van Binsbergen has added another dimension to discussion 
of religious change in Africa by shifting to this historical-
materialist perspective. As with Rigby's study, attention is 
focussed on the alienating influence of certain modes of pro-
duction. To account for variation in religious innovation, 
however, van Bin~bergen utilizes the notion of superstructural-
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reconstruction. With the articulation of modes of production 
causing infrastructural changes that threaten the reproduction 
leads to · 
cf a mcce of production and/ al_ien\ing class formation, other 
~ 
superstructures are required. to justify these changes. 2 Geertz•s 
.; "'. . ... . ~ i · . ~ t th b. . . hi uez1niv1on c. re 1g1on,g4ven a e eg1nn1ng oft s essay; 
corresponds to what is meant by a superstructure here.JThe 
infrastructure is the articulated modes of production within 
a social for.nation.4 Superstructural reconstruction is dem~nded 
not as a result of contact with other. superstructures as :. 
Horton would advocate, but to overcome the alienating influence 
of in:fra.st!'uc~~al changes. Van Bins bergen notes that this 
reconstr~ction has taken three forms in Zambian religious 
in.~ovations (1981:57). He refers to these three as a correspon-
dence, a dialectical correspondence, and a dialectical ccmpensa-
ti on. 
Correspondence involves anacquiesence or even a positive 
f 
support for the infrastructural change. Examples of this are 
the chieftain cults that energed with the tributary mode of 
production and much of missionary Christianity that endorsed 
the "civilizing" influence of capitalism. 
Considerable attention is devoted in van Binsbergen•s 
study to the category of a dialectically corresponding religious 
response. Here he notes a symbolic arnbivalence as the response 
attempts to encompass the articulation experience. The result 
is "an ambivalence at the level of consciousness that impedes 
the emergence of class consciousness" (1981158). The foremost 
example of this is the cul ts of affliction and s1a;r1e prophetic 
cults. What van Binsbergen ~as noted with the affliction 
cults i~ Zambia is that their emergence involving alien 
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attribution of evil and increasing individualism with "entre-
preneurial attitudes" came at the time of an increase in the 
alien influence and enterpreneuring that was represented in the 
articulation between tributary social formations and mercantile 
trade. The change that occurred with the beginnings of industrial 
capital penetration on the socio-economic and political level 
was accompanied by further changes in affliction cults with 
the rise of prophetic leaders and regional identification of 
cults concomitant with increased individual aspirations and 
the establishment of colonial urban centers , (1981144). Signifi-
cant here is that this reigious innovation is not seen as a part 
of the ideological superstructure of any one mode of production ~lone 
but that, in offering escape from the "alien evils", they serve 
to aid in the acceptance of the social-structural changes 
occurring in the articulation process with a certain symbolic 
ambivalence~ The increasing impersonal idiom of these cults 
recalls Horton's contention that the personal idiom of the 
microcosm (corresponding to the domestic mode of production) 
will become increasingly impersonal under the influence of the 
macrocosm (id.entifiable here as the capitalist mode of produc-
tion ). Van Binsbergen suggests a clever ideological intent here. 
In his words, "The pattern of diffusion of these cults and their 
association with alienness suggests that traders had a direct 
hand in their proliferation and spread. If this is true.then 
part of their inspiration may have derived from the need of 
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entrepreneurs to adopt and develop such a new conception of 
suffering as could free them· from the evil connotations with 
which they used to besurrounde~"(1981s16J). This was an alterna-
tive to witchcraft with attenuated attention given to malice 
and guilt underlying suffering. 
The third possible reconstruction that van Binsbergen 
notes is a dialectical compensation taking the form of protest 
movements. In this kind of resp~e,revolutionary potential 
is evident ·_as a ciass consciousness is made manifest within 
the reli gious idiom. With variation in other contexts~the 
example V2..l, Bi.nsbergen studies is that of the tumpa movement 
in Zambia led by the prophetess Alice Lenshina be.ginning in 
1955 and growing rapidly in just a few years to include some 
sixty-five thousand people. What made the movement revolutionary . 
was its symbolic revival calling for the reformation of the 
pre-articulation domestic community. Thus, there was a counter-
acting of the art i culation of modes of pz'tluction and the beginnings 
of infrastructural change challenging the alienating peasantiza-
tion ~~d prolitization that occur with articulation • . As it presented 
a serious challenge to the interes ts of an emerging ruling class 
in Zambia, the Lu~pa movement was r a ther brutally crushed. in 1964. 
But simi l ar expressions of dialec t ical compensation can be found 
. in other independent churches and prophetic movements (198 ~ 158 
and chapter 8). 
The nature of the effects of economic exploitation. with 
t he acc omp~~~ng alienating influence of the articulation process , 
as labour becomes increasingly c ommodi tize d in the formation 
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.of peasantry and proletarian populations (not to mention the 
slave trade) has confronted African populations with an evil 
that ce!'tainly fits Geertz's nption of a breakdown of symbolic 
structures at the limits of a peoples' endurance of suffering . 
altering these peoples responses to natural evils. Van 
Binsbergen found in Zambian people that.during the period of 
accelerated ch~""lge between the two world wars when an unprecedented 
onoressed the people 
amount of misf'ortune in the form of epidemics of smallpox and 
~ 
I 
influen~~, locust plagues, together with economic depression , 
interpretations given for evil. Traditional understandings 
including witchcrart were considered inadequate to deal with 
the problem~. Eschatological interprstations introduced by 
Watchtower movements offered incentive for endurance by promising 
that the suffering would not last long and would be followed 
by the inauguration of bliss. But these, though they achieved 
initial success, began to decline when their unfulfilled 
prophecies became evident. A~iction cults dealt with evil 
I . 
on a very _individual level leaving behind the communal concerns 
of earlier interpretations of suffering. Hardships were exper-
ienced within an extremely individualist frame of reference (19811171). 
III 
The ' concern with moral evil as encountered in ethical 
situation reveals changes reflecting quests for interpretation 
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that are perhaps best exemplified in studies that have been done 
' 
on the phenomenon of sorcory. Socio-economic changes he.ve 
effected changes in this practice as well. Dominique Zahan, 
postulates that, "Sorcery exists only in terms of an ideal 
society, communaL in form, which by its very structure excludes 
the principle of the individual, of the isolated man." Sub-
given in the form of noting that to escape 
sorcery, African societies must resort to "disintegration and 
dispersion o:f traditional kinship, in other words, the rupture 
of ancestral social cohesion and the modification of modes of 
thought concerning society" (1979:101). Consideration of this 
opinion is given only to illustrate how a diametrically opposite 
view can perhaps better delineate the practice of sorcery. 
Sorcery can be viewed as a means of rupturing ancestral social 
I 
cohesion as well, and a practice that becomes exacerbated before 
it disappears. 
M. G. Marwick's study entiltled "The Sociology of Socery 
in a Central Af~ican Tribe" (1967), entailing interpretation of 
.data collected among the Chewa people of present day Zambia, 
points to the disintegrative function of sorcery. Beliefs in 
sorcery are viewed as a means of formulating tense relationships 
involving competition f~r leadership or property. These relation-
ships are always personal ones in which all facets of personalities 
are exposed (1967:125-126). "Ceia beliefs in sorcery are .•. 
catalytic to the normal process of matrilineage segmentation 
in that they are a means by which redundant, insupportable 
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relationships, which through being close and personal cannot 
be quietly contracted out of', are dramatically blasted away" 
( 1 967 .. - ~) ,... . =~i.,..,. • This understanding can be extended by questioning 
what Marwick calls "the normal process" and identifying the 
predisposing mechanisms of lineage segmentation. 
With insight into the changing nature of pre-colonial 
Afric~ societies, esp.ecially with the rise of the tributary 
mode of production articulating via trade routes with mercan-
tile capital. va.11. Binsbergen has advanced another version of 
t h e ~"'ldersta_~dir.g of sorcery practice. Early African societies 
having been deeply egalitarian were faced with a serious rupture 
when chieftainships emerged. A connection is noted between the 
i nstitution of chieftainships and the "manipulative use of 
s orcery" as a means of curtailing envious subjects. The articu-
lation with mercantile capital provided for an accumulation 
of individual wealth by chiefs. With "insufficient ideological 
justifi cation of high status", the personal advancement of chiefs 
at co'll..tnunal expense, was protected by the terror of witchcraft. 
Chiefs as well as trade assumed witchcraft connotations (19811162). 
It may rem2iri impossible to develop~ generalized understand-
ir.g o~ so~cery ~s understanding of the practice itself. ha s 
undergone c onsideralbe change among those that believe in it. 
S~il l , unders t anding of this phenomenon in Africa seems to 
emerge best at the juncture of ind i vidual ach ievement and strong 
social cohesion idealogies. The recurrent close association 
of "envy, disaster, property, and witchcraft" gives further 
· clues to the nature of the subject (E. Ardener 1970:149). 
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It is in the jealously egalitarian societies that incidence of 
sorcery is greatest. But th'e source of this jealousy needs to 
be identified. In a changing~ociety it is more apt to come 
from outside influences; as with the penetration of capital 
enabling individuals to realize an accumumulation of wealth. 
That the understanding of sorcery by these people can also 
change t.as been noted in some studies. Marwick points ou~ that 
sorcery used to serve a very conservative functions ",an effective 
means or dra:natizing social norms ••• (by providing) in the .. 
person of the mystical evil-doer, a symbol of all that i~ held 
to be anti-social and illegitimate." This conservative function 
identifying scrce~y with the victimizer can change when "indigenous 
values are threatened by intrusive ones, and indigenous social 
relationships are displaced by new ones or at least fundamentally 
altered by new conditions ••• (In this new situation) the moral 
aspect of sorcery sometimes has reference to the victim in 
that his misfortune may be retrospectively attributed to his 
·vwn fcolish~ess er failings" ( 1967: 124). 5 
The tension between the incompatible values of "achievement 
as evil egotism~ and "achievement as rendering life its ultimate 
all unique to Africa, is evident 
--hewe·?er, in the practice of sorcery (van Binsbergen 1981: 16.5). 
The accelerated change caused by capital penetration into 
Africa needs to be examined further for clues to the exacerbated 
inc~ease in sorcery as it is capitalism that so distinctly 
promotes the later view. 6 During the colonial period individual 
achievers participating rnor~ clearly in the capitalist exploitation 
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ran the risks of being branded as witches. This may explain 
why witchcraft-eradication .campaigns, widespread in some 
parts of Africa1are most often innitiated by migrant labourers 
and persons pursu~ing modern careers (van Binsbergen 1981:165). 
E. Ardener, in a study done in West Cameroon, indicates a 
similarR.ttern to what van Binsbergen suggests. The situation 
Ardener studies entails tremendous change wrought by the arti-
culation of modes of production with chang.ing responses on 
the part of the peoples effected. Refusal to articulate was 
reinforced ~.I sorcery threats against individual achievers. 
Articulation began when it could be done through communal. 
cash-crop efforts and was accompanied by witchcraft eradication 
movements which in turn made it safe for individual achievers . 
(1970:149). 
A complete study of sorcery in Africa would have to develop 
as a history of changing beliefs. Early forms of the terrorizing 
practice were exacerbated by increased jealousies resulting from 
increased potenti~l for the accumulation of wealth occurring 
with the articulation of modes of production. This accentuated 
form of the practice reflects the conflicts of an unintegrated 
synthysis of two or more ideologies. Like affliction cults, 
a . 
this form of sorcery belief is ~dialectically corresponding 
superstructural reconstruction that remains ambivalent and 
can serve the ideological interests of both individual achievers 
as well as those who seek to preserve the egalitarianism of the 
traditional societies. The rise of witchcraft eradication 
movements seems to be a more definite move toward an acquiesence 
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to the capitalist mode of production with its accompaning 
impersonal ideological idiom. Refusal to participate in the 
~ 
competitive struggle is given a morally evil connotation. 
Relationships become increasingly impersonal and segmented. 
In Marwick's words, this allows "tensions to be isolated and 
compart'l:lentalized, and expressed in forms very different from 
those of a society small enough in scale to be dominated by 
the idea cf personal influence" (1967:126). Sorcery may cease 
in a.~ industrialized capitalist societ~ with the moral evils 
embedded in the cc~petitive struggle assuming new forms of 
injustice, but among peasantry, where articulation continues, 
.... . · l~k 1 . . 1~ is ~ e y ~c remain. 
It is necessary now to sum up this discussion of findings 
regarding what Geertz spoke of as a breakdown of symbolic 
structures at the limits of a peoples' endurance of suffering 
and at the limits oftt? . ...ir experience of moral insight. The 
usefulness of the concept of superstructural-reconstruction, 
in the context of change resulting from the articulation of 
modes of production1becomes apparent as it encompasses not only 
the symbolizing p!"ocess but also the underlying infrastructural 
sources of change. ' New contexts of suffering and moral evil 
are brought into focuss. Alienation resulting from the commoditi-
-zation of labour and widespread inequit~ in the distribution 
of material goods1 confronte d the African with new experiences 
of suffering. This historical-materialist perspective also 
yields insight into the ideological intent that can be embedded 
in reconstructed interpretations given to these suf-ferings. 
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It is a return to a more personal idiom attributing .much of 
human suffering to human injustice and identifying behind 
the alien and impersonal economic transactions the exploitive 
intentions in relations of production. In-as-much as this 
provides an objectivating interpretation> it offers a position 
from which the nature a.11d effectiveness of religious responses 
to suffering ca.11 be assessed. 
IV 
In conc~uding it will be useful to note further the intent 
of Geertz•s treatment of religion as a cultural system. In 
his words, "the Problem of Meaning ••• is a matter of affirming, 
or at least recognizing, the inescapability of ignorance, pain, 
.-
and injustice on the human plane while simultaneously denying 
that these irrationalities are characteristic of the world as 
a whole." The critical question that follows is1 "How is it 
that this denial comes to be believed? and how is it that the 
religious man moves from a troubled perception of experienced 
· diso~der to a more or less settled conviction of fundamental 
order?" (1966:24). 
Emerging into focus is a question that has not been dealt 
with directly in this essay and remains beyond the scope of 
this study but nevertheless is very relevant to it. That is 
the question of the relation of religion to ideology. This 
issue, however, need not arrest all investigation if, as 
Wyatt MacGaffey notes, it is recognized that, "The value of 
this definition (of religion that Geertz offers) is precisely 
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that it applies as well to ideology as to belief, and indeed 
also to both social science and, at a certain level, natural 
science" (1 981:231). Thus, when Geertz speaks of "affirming, 
Y. 
or at least recognizing, the inescapability of ignorance, pain, 
and injustice on the human plane", the potential for ideological 
abuse is obvious. The question is whether religious cultural 
systems offer merely a restoration of intellectual and emotional 
equili~rium, while failing to deal with the sources of conflict 
that creates the disequilibrium, or whether such symbolic 
systems are a recognition of necessity and a projection -of the 
potentiality for change. Geertz does note that religions 
afflict as ?!lUc.h as they comfort; creating disequilibrium that 
can demand the redress of personal or social evils o(l966a18). 
But this is not a point that he develops. It is a point, 
however, that is pivotal1 in assessing religious change, in a 
context such as Africa. 
Hort·on' s theory of religious change focuses on the re-
establishment of intellectual equilibrium and is a useful 
model for describing a part of the process of religious change 
' in Africa. He fa~ls, however,to address the ideological 
intent embedded in the alleged "value free" and impersonal 
idiom of western -scientific thought. Western education it,• 
must be remembered, was introduced int o Africa in order that 
Africans could better cooperate in serving western interests. 
The foremost value of a historical-materialist theory of 
religious change is that it unmasks the ideological interests 
that religious i nnovation can serve. Van Binsbergen• s developing 
.. 
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theory is a very helpful contribution toward understanding this 
dynamic in an African context. He is convinced.that in the 
concept of the articulation of~ modes of production) he has 
located the foremost mechanism both predisposing and precipitat-
ing religious change. - This articulation of pre-capitalist 
modes cf production to to capitalism is ~the major historical 
process having taken place in Africa over the last few centuries, 
and the necessary background for case studies of social, political 
or religi~us cha.~ge" {1981s257). However, to the effectiveness 
of this proble~atic as a critique needs to be added theoretical 
insight that can account for the variability in genesis and 
expression of the emerging symbols. Religious symbolic structures 
.persist in being able to occupy a position of relative autonomy. 
It is this capacity~ of the symbolic that has stimulated 
van Binsbergen's study so much. In his words1 
What is so fascinating in religion, African and other-
wise, is not that it is a true reflexion of processes 
of material production, but that it tries (in vain?) 
to transce~d these processes, thus displaying -something 
of unique value; not, I should say, a spark of the 
divine; but at least courage on a truly human scale 
(1981;70). 
In this regard . ~an Binsbergen speaks of the need for a 
marxist theory of symbols with, perhaps, cross-fertilization 
with theories such as those of symbolic anthropologists. Develop-
ing this essay with an outline from symbolic anthropology is an 
attempt to recognize the overlapping concerns of these two 
problematics. 
It seems to this author, at this point, that such a theory 
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would have to consider not only the symbolizing pro<?ess as a 
concealing process.masking exploitative relationships, but would 
also have to consider the position symbols occupy in revealing 
and reconstructing new possibilities. Paul Ricouer speaks of this 
dual potential of symbolized expression.7 The former critique 
he speaks of as a "hermeneutics of suspicion". As in a historical 
mat~eri~1ist critique, the hermeneutical task in this regard is 
to unmask the distortions that symbols can perpetuate (and in 
doing so, heighten class consciousness). However, to do justice ~ 
to the sy-mbolic .function, Ricouer is of the opinion that another 
direction of interpretation of symbols must b.e gr~nted legi t!ma:cy. 
In the second approach> there is an effort away from reductionistic 
thought toward a "recollection of meaning". Here there is a 
progressive move to develop the full intentionality of the 
symbol. The aim is discriptive, not explanatory. There is a 
"truth" recognized in symbols as they signify :fulfillment. 
Though .Ricouer does not claim the key to any obsolute knowledge 
here, nevertheless. the eschatological directiveness of symbols 
.is, in his opi~ion, a very real part of symbolic experience 
(Nelsons 1982). 
A theory of religious symbolism in a changing society 
would need to encompass this disclosive, aschatological dimension 
of symbols and the restoration of meaning that occurs with it. 
Certainly there are parellels here with the eschatological 
vision of historical-materialists but it would also enable one 
to investigate the contribution that millenarian beliefs make 
to revolutionary praxis. If symbols serve a dislosing function 
they predispose transformation. One has to 
can be transform~tion without such employment 
and how do religious symbols contribute here? 
t he need to investigate how such~transformation symbol can be 
exp~ted, capitalizing on the concealing potentials of that same 
using it . 
symbol and /\ to serve a disguising function> neutralizing praxis. 
Any eschatological vision is fraught with the dangers of being 
abused as a disguise. The final concern, is whether a development 
of a theory of symbols along the :' lines of this "conflict of 
interpretations". as Ricouer speaks of it, rieutr~lizes and diffuses 
praxis or contributes to an objectivating,that can be useful to 
such praxis1as it discloses the role of symbolism in religious 
innovation. 
How is it that denials of the irrationalitJes of ignorance, 
pain, and injustice come to be believed? The mystification of 
the si tua-::.::.tion is oneresponse and perhaps the more common one. 
Insight into the conflict laden context and affirma tion of new 
possibilities, with mobilization of efforts toward their reali-
zation, is an alternative response. This latter response is not, 
however, to use I • • Geertz • s phrase, "asettled coninction of funda-
mental order". It is rathe~ the formulation and maintenance of 
a dynamic tens i on. To speak of this as a symbolic function, 
or in investigating how this potential emerges out of religious 
more 
symbolism, requires a 0 expanded theory of symbolism than what 
Geertz employs. Not only the equilibri um creating capacity of 
s ymbols but their capacity to maintain a dynamic tension, 
perpetualting a disequilibrium, needs to be noted. It is in the 
religious symbolic formulation of this dialecti c that hope can be 
creat e d. 
NOTES 
1) Reference is being made here to the rise of chieftainships 
with their accompaning cults that were forms of alienating 
social structure as will be developed later in this essay. 
2). The reproduction of a mode of production occurs on three 
levelsc "Materially {so that the necessary productive forces 
are available), denfgraphically (in order to have human per-
sonnel}, organizationally and ideol'€;ically" {van Binsbergen 
1981:4.J). Without this reproduction a mode of reproduction 
wiil not survive. 
J) Geertz•s description is close enough to serve our purposes 
here as it appiies equally well to ideological and religious 
symbo1ic systems. "The superstructure defines a societys 
central concerns, major institutuins, and basic norms and 
values ••• (it is) the central repository of meaning for the 
membe~s of society. It offers them an explanatory framework" (Yan Einsbergen 1981a27J). 
4) Van binsbergen defines an infrastructure as "the organization 
of the production upon which the participants' lives depend, 
and particularly such differential distribution .of power 
and resources as dominate the relations of production" (1981:2?J). 
5) In Marwick's study sample, half of the alleged sorcerers 
had anti-social traits before the suspicion and "about 
60% of believed victims or their close associat~s -· had been 
considered guilty of a misdemeanour directly related to the 
attack made on them". Also indicated was "that modern 
objects of competiti('n, such as cattle, money and other 
property, crop up in over half the cases of accusations" 
(1967:124). 
6} 'rhat sorcery is conspicuously rare among East African pastoralists 
who resisted .the penetration of capitalism is a further 
clue (Rigby 19B1:10J)o Still, another clue, that may be 
evident, is the connection between the commoditization of 
labour and belief in zombies, a prominent aspect of sorcery, 
as E. Ardener indirectly suggests (19701148). · · · 
7) Ricouer innitially develops his hermeneutical theory in, 
Freud and Philosophy (1970), Further developments and 
applications appear in Conflict of Interpretations (1974). 
•• 
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